This Chapter reviews the theoretical liteature on entry games and free entry equilibria. We show that a wide range of symmetric oligopoly models share common comparative statics properties. Individual pro…ts and quantities decrease in the number of …rms, and tend to competitive or monopolistic competitive equilibria when the number of …rms increases inde…nitely. The maximum number of …rms sustainable in a symmetric long run equilibrium depends on technology (economies of scale), preferences (market size) and strategies (toughness of price competition). On the normative side, in homogeneous product markets the business stealing e¤ect drives the result of excessive entry, whereas adding product di¤er-entiation and the utillity from variety may revert the result. We then consider asymmetric free entry equilibria that exploit the aggregative nature of many oligopoly models. Finally, we discuss endogenous sunk costs and persistent concentration and frictionless entry and contestable markets.
Introduction
Which elements may explain why certain industries are populated by a large number of …rms, each covering a small fraction of total output, whereas other markets are dominated by a small number of large …rms that supply a relevant fraction of customers? These questions are at the core of the topics studied in Industrial Organization from the very beginning. 1 These research topics have been approached in the early phases of Industrial Economics mostly in an empirical perspective 2 within the Structure-Conduct-Performance paradigm, while 1 the theoretical foundations of endogenous market structures have been explored more rigorously in the game theoretic framework of the new Industrial Organization. The analytical framework that has been developed looks at market entry and exit as the process that endogenously determines the number and characteristics of active …rms. In this setting, then, other research questions emerge. How do these market structures change in reaction to a variation in some key parameters? Are we able to identify a set of robust comparative statics properties in oligopoly markets, despite the rich variety of models in the IO literature? And …nally, on the normative side, does entry into the market, a key component of the competitive process, leads to a welfare maximizing outcome, or the number and characteristics of …rms may be excessive or short of the e¢ cient one? This Chapter deals with the theories of market equilibria when the number and characteristics of the active …rms are endogenously determined through the process of entry. More precisely, we shall review the literature on entry games and free entry equilibria in a multi-stage game framework. A large number of potential entrants decide …rst whether to enter or not; once all the …rms have undertaken their entry decisions, the active …rms compete according to some oligopoly game. The Chapter is organized as follows. In Section 2 we present the general analytical framework. In Section 3 we analyze a wide range of symmetric oligopoly models to identify the relationship between the number of …rms and the market equilibria: we start with homogeneous products and competition in strategic substitutes (Section 3.1), moving then to di¤erenti-ated products and competition in strategic complements (Section 3.2), o¤ering a general explanation of the comparative statics properties (Section 3.3) and concluding with cartels (Section 3.4). Next we consider free entry equilibria and the determinants of the maximum number of …rms (Section 4). Finally, we consider symmetric entry games under a normative perspective (Section 5), looking at the comparison between the free entry and the welfare maximizing number of …rms. In Section 6 we move to asymmetric free entry equilibria that exploit the aggregative nature of most oligopoly models. We then present the case of endogenous sunk cost and persistent concentration (Section 7) and the one of frictionless entry and contestable markets (Section 8). Concluding remarks follow.
Entry games
There are several ways to model the entry process and the market interaction among active …rms. The various set-ups allow to highlight di¤erent issues, focussing on distinct e¤ects that interact in the overall market dynamics. A key distinction can be drawn between the environments in which the entry decisions precede the market strategies, and those where entry decisions of some …rms are undertaken after market strategies of others have been already chosen and observed.
In the former case, the market strategies of individual …rms cannot be chosen with the purpose of a¤ecting the entry decisions of any …rm, since these latter have already been undertaken, although the features of the market equilibria affect the early decision to enter. In this perspective, multi-stage games represent a suitable formal framework. There is a large group of m potential entrants j 2 I m that choose whether to enter, incurring a …xed set-up cost F > 0, or not; then, once they have taken their decision and the set of n m entrants i 2 I n is common knowlege, the active …rms play a market game. This set-up is usually adopted to study long run free entry equilibria, in which a set of exogenous variables referred to the primitives of technology and preferences explain the long run market structure.
Alternatively, in a second class of strategic environments, a subset of early entrants (incumbents) commit to observable market strategies before the other …rms (entrants) decide whether to enter or not. The incumbents'initial strategy, then, may a¤ect the entry decisions, explaining why this set-up is widely used to study strategic entry deterrence and foreclosure. In this environment, the market structure is explained by foreclosure strategies, based on a rich set of strategic tools, rather than on market fundamentals.
The two set-ups are useful to explore di¤erent and complementary issues and are characterized by a di¤erent time horizon. Sequential entry with incumbents and entrants is a more realistic representation of short run market dynamics, since entry is typically an on-going process where already established and new …rms interact. The possibility of foreclosure, then, is an empirically relevant issue that characterizes the evolution of markets. At the same time, multi-stage entry game allow to abstract from these short run phenomena and focus on the underlying features of preferences and technology as long run drivers of market evolution. By moving the attention to this complementary perspective we can identify fundamental forces that, despite the frictions that in the short run may slow down the process and foreclose the market, push towards a more or less concentrated market. Since in this Chapter the focus is on long run market structures rather than foreclosure, we will consider several and di¤erent speci…cations of multi-stage entry game.
A second relevant feature that is recurring across models is the assumption of symmetric …rms. Supply side symmetry is a natural assumption in a long run perspective, since we may think that any barrier to access to best practice technology, as patent protection or private know how, tends to vanish in the long run. Demand side symmetry, consistent with homogeneous products or horizontal product di¤erentiation and di¤erent varieties, is a convenient assumption when we want to analyze the number of entrants and the distribution of market shares. 3 The di¤erent models considered in the next sections make use of the symmetry assumption at di¤erent levels, either applying it to the whole population of potential entrants, or to a subset of them identi…ed as marginal entrants, while allowing for asymmetries across majort market players. We shall see that the symmetry assumption is also at the core of the analysis of potential competition and contestable markets.
Symmetric Oligopoly Markets
We start our analysis of entry games by considering the (second stage) market games where n …rms are active, having decided to enter in the …rst stage. In this section we consider symmetric market games where all the n …rms share the same (best practice) technology and no one has an advantage on the demand side, e.g. a higher quality product. In this setting, when …rms adopt the same strategies a i = a, i 2 I n , then they obtain the same level of pro…ts. A symmetric environment greatly simpli…es the analysis of free entry equilibria, since the equilibrium pro…ts, as well as the equilibrium strategies, consumers' surplus and welfare, all depend on a vector x of parameters related to the properties of costs (technology) and demand (preferences), and on the number of …rms n: i (a i ; a 1 ) = (n; x). Market equilibria once the entry process has been completed, therefore, can be analyzed simply in terms of the number of …rms n. The individual equilibrium pro…ts (n; x) are therefore the object that potential entrants consider when, at the initial stage of the game, they choose whether to enter or not, given their expectation of the number of …rms that will enter.
Oligopoly theory o¤ers a very rich set of models that describe market interaction among n competitors, ranging from homogeneous to di¤erentiatied products and distinguishing competition in strategic substitutes or complements. In all these environments, moreover, demand and cost functions can be speci…ed di¤erently. Finally, beyond static, possibly multi-stage games, the literature on tacit collusion adds to the toolkit the analysis of cartels. A general theory of free entry equilibria has to encompass all these classes of models, admitting a variety of business strategies, modes of strategic interaction and features of demand and costs. In this perspective, then, the key point is whether there exist some regularities across di¤erent models in the relationship between the number of (symmetric) active …rms n and the equilibrium pro…ts they obtain (n; x). A …rst, relevant result, that we are going to present in the next sections, is that, despite the signi…cant di¤erences in oligopoly equilibria across models, we can establish under very general conditions a negative relationship between the equilibrium pro…ts and the number of …rms.
We organize the discussion considering three di¤erent cases: homogeneous products and strategic substitutes, di¤erentiated products and strategic complements and repeated games.
Homogeneous products and strategic substitutes
Our …rst look at symmetric oligopoly equilibria refers to a market with n …rms producing a homogeneous product and competing in strategic substitutes, usually associated with the Cournot model. Since the pioneering work of Cournot (1838) a large set of contributions has explored the conditions for the existence and characterized the equilibria when n …rms compete in quantities. McManus (1962) and (1964) and Roberts and Sonnenschein (1976) , independently proved the existence of a symmetric equilibrium in symmetric Cournot games with convex costs. Novshek (1985) showed that an n-oligopoly has a Nash equilibrium if each …rm's marginal revenue is decreasing in the other …rms'aggregate output. A step forward in proving the existence of Cournot equilibria under general conditions is in Vives (1990) , who showed in the duopoly case the relationship between the assumptions of the previous literature and the submodularity of Cournot games. Supermodular games and the techniques of monotone comparative statics 4 , have proved to be extremely useful tools to explore the properties of Cournot oligopolies and to identify the general conditions under which the comparative statics of equilibria can be analyzed. We summarize here the main results following this approach as in Amir and Lambson (2000) .
Consider an oligopoly with n …rms o¤ering a homogeneous product and producing with the same cost function C(q i ) and incurring no capacity constraint over the relevant output range. Market inverse demand P (Q) is a continuous and di¤erentiable function of total output Q = n P i=1 q i . The pro…t function of …rm i, then, is:
where Q i = fq j g j6 =i is the vector of outputs of the other …rms. In this traditional speci…cation, each …rm maximizes its pro…ts by choosing a level of output for given strategies of the other …rms, Q i . It is well recognized that under standard assumptions …rm i's best reply b q i (Q i ) = arg max qi i (q i ; Q i ) is downward sloping, implying a submodular game and competition in strategic substitutes.
Let us de…ne
Then, Amir and Lambson (2000) prove that if (q i ; Q) > 0 on the relevant range of outputs and the inverse demand function is log-concave, there exists a unique and symmetric equilibrium, with individual output q (n) nonincreasing in n and total output Q (n) nondecreasing in n. 5 This condition holds, for instance, in the set-up adopted in the works of McManus, Roberts and Sonnenschein (1976) and Novshek (1985) quoted above and is consistent with the framework proposed in Vives (2000) .
To illustrate this result with an example let us consider the linear Cournot model: market demand is Q = S [ p], where S measures market size, e.g. the number of consumers. Then, the inverse demand is P ( Q S ) = a b Q S where a = , b = 1 and Q is total supply. Firms produce at constant marginal cost c 2 (0; a) and compete in quantities. Then, each …rm selects its optimal output by solving q i = arg max qi P ( Q S ) c q i . The symmetric equilibrium quantity q (n) satis…es for all …rms the …rst order conditions:
Substituting and solving for the symmetric equilibrium we get:
When the number of …rms increases, therefore, the individual quantity decreases whereas total output increases. Consequently, the market clearing price falls and tends to the marginal cost when the number of …rms increases inde…-nitely. Finally, the equilibrium pro…ts, gross of the …xed entry costs, decrease in n and tends to zero in the limit, due to the combined quantity and price e¤ects.
This pattern characterizes the so called Cournotian paradigm, a representation of the market equilibrium that depends on the number of …rms and that moves from the monopoly to the perfectly competitive equilibrium as n increase from 1 to in…nity. Perfect competition, in this setting, corresponds to the limiting case when each …rm supplies an in…nitesimal amount of output in a market populated by an in…nite number of neglibile …rms.
This structural view of perfect competition can be easily derived from the …rst order condition that guarantee a pro…t maximising solution for any number of …rms. Equation (2), indeed, implies that the market clearing price tends to the marginal cost when the last term vanishes. There are two possible explanations why P 0 q S ! 0. One argues that when …rms are small with respect to the market, they follow a price taking behavior, that is they expect the market price not to react to any change in their individual ouput. This case corresponds to assuming P 0 = 0 in a perfectly competitive market. The other explanation, that is consistent with the structuralist view of the Cournotian paradigm, instead focusses on the fact that it is the individual quantity that vanishes as n becomes inde…nitely large, whereas P 0 < 0 even in the limit. In this latter case, indeed, lim n!1 q (n) = 0, as evident from (3) .
It is interesting to notice that the last term in (2) represents also the negative externality that characterizes strategic interaction in a Cournot game, i.e.
S . In other words, with Cournot competition each …rm a¤ects the rivals'pro…ts when it increases its quantity since it makes the price falling and reduces the revenues that the competitors obtain from their production. The level of individual production, therefore, a¤ects multiplicatively this externality, that vanishes when each …rm produces a negligible output. Then, a perfectly competitive market in a Cournotian perspective is also characterized in the limit by vanishing externalities across …rms. This result con…rms the idea that in a perfectly competitive market no externality occurs, a feature that is driven by the same e¤ect (lim n!1 q (n) = 0) that explains why the competitive price tends to the marginal cost.
Finally, market size S increases individual and total quantities as well as the equilibrium pro…ts.
Di¤erentiated products and strategic complements
A di¤erent class of oligopoly models moves into the realm of di¤erentiated products and assumes that …rms compete in prices, a framework that entails strategic complementarities. In the product di¤erentiation literature, moreover, we can assume that either di¤erentiation does not break the intrinsic symmetry of …rms'market positions, or alternatively that product di¤erentiation introduces a competitive advantage for some …rms with respect to the others. The former case reminds the idea of (horizontal) di¤erentiation by variety, where products di¤er in terms of characteristics, each one being more …t to a speci…c subset of customers. The latter, instead, captures the idea of (vertical) di¤erentiation in quality. Given our focus on symmetric equilibria, in this section we shall consider several approaches to di¤erentiation by variety. We shall consider entry and di¤erentiation by quality in Section 7.
There are three main ways to model te demand side when products are (horizontally) di¤erentiated. The representative consumer approach characterized by preference for variety, the discrete choice model where the external observer is able to reconstruct consumers'behavior up to a random component related to unobservable individual characteristics, and the address approach, that assumes heterogeneous consumers with inelastic demand. 6 Let q i = S D i (p i ; p i ) be the demand for product i 2 I n , where S measures the size of the market and p i is the vector of prices other than p i . Let us further assume D i (:) is continuous and di¤erentiable and
Finally, let us assume that each …rm o¤ers only one variety. 7 Each …rm solves 6 For a detailed analysis of these three approaches and the relationships among them see Anderson et al. (1992) . On the representative consumer models see, for instance, the CES representation adopted in Spence (1976) and Dixit and Stiglitz (1977) and the linear representation in Levitan and Shubik (1980) and Singh and Vives (1984) . On the interpretations of random utility models Manski (1977) assumes that utility is deterministic but the external observed cannot perfectly observe it, while Quandt (1956) assumes the individual behavior to be intrinsically probabilistic. Finally, the address model approach was …rst proposed in Hotelling (1929) . See also Salop (1979) and d 'Aspremont et al. (1979) . 7 As we shall discuss in Section 4, assuming single product …rms makes the analysis of the maximum number of varieties and that of …rms equivalent. With multiproduct …rms, instead, the maximum number of varieties will be larger than the number of active …rms in a free entry equilibrium. the following problem: max pi (p i c)D i (p i ; p i ). Under standard assumptions on the strategy space being compact and convex, and the pro…t function being quasi-concave, the following equation identi…es the necessary and su¢ cient conditions for a maximum:
where " i is the price elasticity of demand for product i. In a symmetric equilibrium p i = p (n), i 2 I n , and
Hence, the pattern of equilibrium prices p (n) when the number of …rms increases depends on the corresponding pattern of " (n). If lim n!1 " (n) = 1, then in the limit the price converges to the marginal cost, and we replicate the perfectly competitive equilibrium already found in the case of Cournot competition. When, instead, lim n!1 " (n) = " with " …nite, a positive mark up persists in the limit, a pattern associated to Chamberlinian monopolist competition. 8 As we shall see, the limiting properties of the di¤erent approaches to product di¤erentiation are consistent with either of the two alternatives. Let us consider …rst the case of convergence to competitive equilibria. Generalizing the duopoly linear model of Singh and Vives (1984) as in Häckner (2000) , the utility function of the representative consumer is quasi-linear according to the expression:
where 2 [0; 1) measures product substitutability and O is the money spent on outside goods. The demand system, then, is:
where S measures the size of the market, i.e. the number of representative consumers. Notice that in a symmetric price con…guration
decreases in the number of …rms, since consumers spread their purchases over a larger set of varieties. The demand elasticity in a symmetric price equilibrium is:
8 See Vives (1999), pp 160-64 for a detailed discussion.
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Hence, lim " (n) = 1 being p (n) < . Indeed, the equilibrium price
tends to the marginal cost when n ! 1. Moreover, the equilibrium quantity and pro…ts
and
are decreasing in the number of …rms n.
A similar pattern can be obtained within the address models of product differentiation. Following Salop (1979) we can extend the original linear Hotelling duopoly to encompass n active …rms by considering a circular market of length 1 where S consumers are uniformely distributed according to their individual preferred version t. Firms i 2 I n produce at constant marginal cost c and sell horizontally di¤erentiated varieties x i at price p i , being evenly distribued at x i = i=n along the circle. Finally, a consumer of type t purchasing variety i has a net utility u p i (x i t) 2 = . Parameter positively a¤ects product substitutability. When is large the utility mostly depends on the price and the consumers are ready to switch to a more convenient, although more distant, variety. The demand system, in this setting, is given by:
and displays localized competition between neighboring varieties, a notable feature of the address approach. The demand elasticity in a symmetric equilibrium is
and lim n!1 " (n) = 1, implying convergence to the marginal cost. Notice also that, for given n, the elasticity is increasing in the substitutability parameter . The symmetric equilibrium price, quantity and pro…ts, indeed, are given by:
Comparing the symmetric equilibria in the Singh and Vives and in the Salop models of product di¤erentiation with those obtained in the Cournot linear model we …nd signi…cantly similar properties of symmetric market equilibria, with price and individual quantity falling in the number of …rms and the price approaching the marginal cost as the number of …rms tends to in…nity. Indeed, the driving e¤ect we highlighted in Cournot, based on vanishing individual quantities still applies. In the Salop model, however, an additional interesting e¤ect is at work. When n increases inde…nitely the market is completely covered with (locally) almost identical varieties. Localized competition between adjacent varieties reproduces a Bertrand environment, leading to marginal cost pricing. This latter e¤et corresponds to an increasingly intense price competition between closer and closer variety. In other words, in the localized competition model of product di¤erentiation an increase in n produces at the same time a vanishing quantity externality and an increasing price externality, both pushing towards convergence to a competitive outcome.
We can now turn to the case of monopolistic competition, when positive mark-ups are associated with a market populated by a very large (i.e. in…nite) number of in…nitesimal …rms. We illustrate this case referring to the multinomial logit model, covering also the discrete choice approach to product di¤erentiation. Let the utility of a consumer be described by a deterministic component U (p i ) = p i and an additive random i.i.d. component i that is distributed according to the double exponential distribution
where is the Euler's constant and a positive constant that negatively a¤ects the variance. Then, the resulting probability of choosing product i given the vector of prices (p 1 ; :::; p n ) is
Then …rm i's expected pro…ts are:
We can observe that @Pi @pi = P i (1 P i ) and that, therefore, parameter , once again, captures product substitability. Moreover, in a symmetric equilibrium P i (p; p)= 1 n . Then, the elasticity of demand is
with lim n!1 " (n) = p (n) …nite. 9 Hence, the …rms obtain a positive mark-up when n tends to in…nity. The equilibrium price, quantity and pro…ts are:
The multinomial logit model 10 presents a di¤erent pattern of price adjust- 9 Parameter , as in the previous models, positively a¤ects price elasticity for given n. 1 0 A similar result is obtained, within the representative consumer approach, assuming CobbDouglas preferences between a numeraire good q 0 and a set of di¤erentiated products q i with CES preferences:
U (qo; q 1;::: ; qn) = q 1 0 e q with 2 (0; 1) and
See Spence (1976), Dixit and Stiglitz (1977) and Anderson et al (1992) p. 226-9. ment, with the equilibrium price decreasing in the number of …rms and converging to a mark-up 1= when n ! 1. Despite the positive mark-up, the …rm's pro…ts vanish in the limit, since the individual output becomes negligible, as it is in a monopolistic competition environment. We can also notice that the basic channel of interaction across …rms vanishes as well in the limit: @Pi @pj = P i P j = n 2 . Hence, the "competitive" component of monopolistic competition is associated to vanishing externalities, as already observed discussing the Cournot model.
To sum up, the di¤erent models of product di¤erentiation display similar comparative static properties with respect to the number of …rms, with the equilibrium price, quantity and pro…ts falling in n. The main di¤erence rests on the convergence of the equilibrium prices to the marginal cost, as in a perfectly competitive market, or instead to a positive mark-up that characterizes monopolistic competition. Moreover, the size of the market, in all cases, pushes up pro…ts.
The results of the product di¤erentiation literature provide an additional insight that is related to the intensity of price competition and its e¤ect on n…rms market equilibria. In the three models, with a little abuse of notation, we have represented product substitutability through parameter , with the price elasticity increasing and the price and pro…ts falling in .
Explaining the comparative statics in a uni…ed framework
In the previous sections we have shown that the market equilibria, described by prices and quantities, share similar comparative statics properties across a wide range of di¤erent oligopoly models and features of preferences and technology. This raises a natural question whether this common pattern may be accounted for through a uni…ed explanation. The theory of monotone comparative statics developed by Milgrom and Roberts (1990) and (1994) and Milgrom and Shannon (1994) o¤ers an enlightening perspective. Their approach allows to develop new tools to study how equilibria change in reaction to a variation in the parameters and constraints of the maximization problem, moving beyond the tradition approach based on the Implicit Function Theorem.
property corresponds to increasing di¤erences (between the endogenous and the exogenous variables, and more in general between two variables), whereas the latter quali…es the function to be maximised as supermodular.
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When a game is supermodular and characterized by increasing di¤erences, an increase in the strategy of one player increases the marginal payo¤ of the strategy of the other players, inducing them to adjust upwards their optimal choice. This case, therefore, corresponds to upward sloping reaction functions or, in the classi…cation of Bulow et al. (1985) , strategic complementarity. Moreover, increasing di¤erences between the endogenous variables and the exogenous variable implies that an increase in the exogenous variable increases the marginal payo¤ of the strategy of the players, with an upwards shift in the best reply functions.
Increasing di¤erences then can be easility turned into decreasing di¤erences by reverting the sign of the adjustment or de…ning a new exogenous variable that is the negative of the original one. In this case, an increase in the exogenous variable induces a contraction in the endogenous one. 13 We can borrow from the theory of monotone comparative statics two conditions, described in the statements of Theorem 5 and 6 of Milgrom and Shannon (1994) that, in our setting, …t the problem. The exogeneous variable 14 is the number of …rms n whereas the endogenous variables are, depending on the model speci…cation, the quantities q i or prices p i . Then, we require the pro…t functions to be supermodular and to display decreasing di¤erences. Since we consider continuous and di¤erentiable functions, the two conditions correspond to @ i @ai@aj > 0 and @ i @ai@n < 0 for i; j = I n , i 6 = j, where a i describes …rm i's strategy, i.e. quantity or price. Moreover, in order to focus on the comparative statics, we give for granted that an equilibrium exists and is unique, by assuming that the pro…t function is strictly quasi-concave in the choice variable and that the best reply slope meets the contraction mapping requirement.
Starting with the Cournot case, a …rst problem arises since in the traditional description competition is in strategic substitutes, and the game is submodular rather than supermodular. 15 A way out of this problem borrows from an early intuition in Novshek (1985) and is developed in Amir and Lambson (2000) . Indeed, a notable property of the Cournot model is that the pro…ts can be 1 2 See Vives (1999), Chapter 2. When the payo¤ functions are smooth and the strategy space of each …rm and the exogenous parameters space are one-dimensional supermodularity and increasing di¤erences boil down to the condition that the second cross partials between each …rm strategic variable and the other …rms' strategic variable and with the exogenous parameter are positive. 1 3 Increasing di¤erences is a cardinal property and can be replaced by the ordinal SpenceMirlees single-crossing property considered in Milgrom and Shannon (1994) . When this property holds, if an increase in the choice variable is pro…table when the exogenous variable is low it is still pro…table when the exogenous variable is high, although it is not required, as in the case of increasing di¤erences, that the pro…tability is higher in the latter case. 1 4 Here for convenience we measure the number of …rms n as a continuous variable de…ned on the positive reals. 1 5 While in a Cournot duopoly this issue is easily adjusted by describing one of the strategies as q, transforming the setting into a supermodular game, with n > 2 …rms this is no more possible.
expressed as a function of the own output q i and of the aggregate level of output of the other n 1 …rms
Moreover, we can describe …rm i's strategy, rather than referred to the choice of its own output q i as the selection of a certain level of total output Q for given ouput Q i supplied by the competitors. In this alternative formulation
Then,
that corresponds to (1) . Then, the condition > 0 implies the supermodularity of the modi…ed Cournot game. Decreasing di¤erences can be easily established noting that when the other n 1 …rms choose the same output q then Q i = (n 1)q. Then, substituting in the …rst order conditions for the choice of Q in the modi…ed Cournot problem we have:
Hence,
when the game is supermodular. We conclude that the equilibrium total ouput Q (n) is increasing in the number of …rms. In a symmetric equilibrium Q i (n) = n 1 n Q (n), and therefore the ouput of the …rms other than i is increasing in n as well, since both terms n 1 n and Q (n) are positive and increasing in n. Moreover, since …rm i's best reply in the original Cournot problem is downward sloping and Q i (n) is increasing in n, the individual output q i (n) is decreasing in the number of …rms. Finally, since demand is bounded, when n ! 1 we must have Q (n) = nq (n) …nite and therefore lim n!1 q (n) = 0. Then, given the …rst order conditions of the original Cournot problem, p (n) ! C 0 (q (n)). Our discussion o¤ers a clear insight on the advantages of the techniques of monotone comparative statics. A single and general condition, = C 00 (q i ) P 0 (Q) > 0, generates supermodularity of the modi…ed Cournot problem and Q (n) and Q i (n) increasing in the number of …rms, while the comparative statics on individual output q i (n) and the limiting competitive result on the price derive from the …rst order conditions of the original Cournot problem. Interestingly, the condition > 0 includes elements of demand and costs, and both jointly de…ne the relevant condition. This extends with respect to previous contributions that explored the properties of Cournot equilibria making speci…c assumptions on costs or demand. 
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Turning to the models of product di¤erentiation and price competition, in a n-…rm oligopoly each one solves max pi p i D i (p i ; p i ; n) C(D i (:)) where we emphasize that, di¤erently from the homogeneous product case, the number of substitute products n may directly enter into the expression of the demand for product i. Moreover, notice that in our symmetric environment we assume that all …rms have the same cost structure, i.e.
for any i; j = I n , i 6 = j, the game is in strategic complements, that is the condition for supermodularity is met. Then, the equilibrium prices fall in the number of …rms if
Substituting the …rst order conditions p i C 0 = Di @Di=@pi and rearranging we get:
Di¤erentiating the elasticity of demand with respect to n, we obtain:
Hence, we can rewrite (23) as
Then, if (22) holds and (24)< 0 for all i 2 I n , the symmetric equilibrium prices fall in the number of …rms. We can notice that the conditions (22) and (24) display a combination of demand and cost elements, a feature already noticed in the Cournot model. For instance, if the marginal costs are not decreasing and the demand elasticity is increasing in the number of …rms, then the conditions are met. Turning to our three examples of di¤erentiated products models referred to the di¤erent approaches, we have derived directly the equilibrium prices and observed that they fall in the number of …rms. It is easy to check that the two consitions (22) and (24) are satis…ed in our examples. Indeed, we assumed in the examples linear costs, i.e. C 00 = 0. Moreover, it can be easily veri…ed that when the other n 1 …rms set the same price p, the elasticity of demand is increasing in n. Hence, the game features supermodularity and increasing di¤erences and the prices fall in n.
Collusive equilibria
We conclude our review of n-…rms oligopolies considering the case of collusive equilibria. We refer to the in…nite horizon repeated game approach pioneered by Friedman (1971) 
Let a be the maximal collusive symmetric con…guration. The …rms maximize the discounted sum of pro…ts
, where = 1=(1 + r) is the discount factor. Each …rm observes the other …rms' actions with a one period lag. The set of observed actions at time t, the history of the game, then, is H t = a 0 ; ::; a t 1 . In what follows we concentrate on symmetric collusive equilibria, in the spirit of the overall section. Let a C be …rm i's collusive action, a C 2 A n be the vector of collusive actions, and C = (a C ) the corresponding pro…ts.
, that is the collusive symmetric allocation is in between the Nash equilibrium and the maximal collusive allocation. Further, de…ne a P = b a …rm i's action during the punishment phase, corresponding to the symmetric Nash equilibrium action in the constituent game, and P = (b a) the punishment pro…ts. Finally, let a D = arg max ai (a i ; a When T = 1 (in…nite horizon), given the strategy followed by the other …rms and the stationarity of the repeated game each …rm chooses to collude if the following incentive compatibility constraint holds:
Then, a well know result (Folk theorem) states that any allocation a 2 A n can be implemented as a subgame perfect equilibrium in the game repeated inde…nitely (T = 1) if the following condition holds 18 for all …rms i 2 I n :
We can now address the key issue, whether the price(s), quantities and pro…ts change, and in which direction, when the number of …rms increases. To answer these questions we can consider two examples of market interaction when …rms o¤er homogeneous products, characterizing the constituent game t as a price setting Bertrand game or a quantity setting Cournot game. Let C = n C be the total pro…ts of the cartel. Then, in a Bertrand setting C = C =n, D = C and P = 0. Then, the condition (25) boils down to
that is increasing in n. In other words, if the basic market interaction takes the form of Bertrand competition with homogeneous products, the incentive compatibility constraint becomes tighter the larger the number of …rms. The economic intuition is pretty simple: a cartel with more members distributes the overall pro…ts C among a larger number of participants, making the individual pro…ts falling. Deviation and punishment pro…ts, in this setting, are instead una¤ected by the number of cartel members, making the condition for cartel sustainability harder to meet. We can further observe that the incentive compatibility constraint does not depend on the speci…c (symmetric) collusive allocation a C the cartelists agree upon, since the gains from deviations are always proportional to the collusive pro…ts. Then, a focal outcome would be to mimic the monopoly price p m . Our prediction, then, is that the market price will be p m if the number of …rms is n 1 1 , falling to the Nash equilibrium price p = c thereafter. To sum up, individual pro…ts are strictly decreasing and the market price is weakly decreasing in the number of …rms.
Turning to the Cournot model, we can indentify a further element in the comparative statics. Indeed, in a Cournot setting the pro…ts in the di¤erent states vary non proportionally in the collusive allocation Q C the …rms choose to implement. More precisely, the incentive compatibility constraint becomes tighter when the …rms coordinate on an allocation, summarized by total output Q C , that is closer to the monopoly output Q m . Hence, in a Cournot setting the critical discount factor (Q C ; n) is decreasing in the collusive output Q C , whereas it continues to be increasing in the number of …rms n. 19 The most collusive sustainable output in a symmetric cartel, Q C , then, is (weakly) increasing in the number of …rms: if we start from Q C = Q m , we can …nd a number of …rms n(Q m ; ) such that (Q m ; n(Q m ; )) = . For a larger number of …rms 1 8 Notice that, having assumed symmetric …rm, the incentive compatibility constraint and the threshold discount factors are the same for each and every …rm. 1 9 For instance, it is easy to show that, in the linear Cournot model when …rms implement the monopoly output the critical discount factor is =
and is therefore increasing in n.
the cartel would collapse. However, the …rms can coordinate on a less collusive output (i.e. Q C > Q m ) such that the incentive compatibility constraint is satis…ed. In general, when (25) holds as an equality, for given we have
Hence, for n n(Q m ; ) the individual pro…ts are decreasing in n while the market price is p m , whereas for n > n(Q m ; ) both the individual pro…ts and the market price are falling in n.
Finally, an informal argument that is often set out refers to the impact of a larger and larger cartel on the monitoring activity that the …rms have to perform to prevent cheating. It seems realistic that such activity may take more time the higher the numer of …rms to be scrutinized. We can include this further argument considering that the length of the period in the repetead game framework may increase when more …rms participate in the agreement and have to be monitored. A longer period, then, corresponds to a lower discount factor , leading to a decreasing relationship (n). In this latter case, the incentive compatibility constraint would become (Q C ; n) (n) and the e¤ect of the number of …rms on the maximal collusive allocation would be
implying a stronger expansion in the cartel output when n increases. Finally, when n ! 1 both P and C tend to zero and the only sustainable output Q C becomes the competitive one. The e¤ect of market size S on collusive equilibria is twofold. Under constant marginal costs, market size and the scale of production a¤ect multiplicatively the pro…ts in each of the relevant states. Then, S cancels out in the expression of the critical discount factor. In other words, under constant marginal costs the incentive compatibility constraints are una¤ected by market size. On the other hand, the level of collusive equilibrium pro…ts C increase with market size.
To sum up, even the cartel equilibria display comparative statics properties similar to those already highlighted: the individual pro…ts decrease, as the market price, when the number of …rms increases, and they tend to the perfectly competitive output when n ! 1. Market size positively a¤ects collusive pro…ts while being neutral on the conditions for sustainability of the cartel. Moreover, the level of pro…ts in a cartel are higher, for a given number of …rms, than those of the oligopoly equilibria analyzed in the previous sections.
Free entry symmetric equilibria
We can now endogenize the entry decision that determines how many of the m potential entrants will decide to become active, sinking the entry cost F . In a symmetric setting, the post entry pro…ts depend on the number of active …rms n and is decreasing in it, as analyzed in detail across a wide set of models in the previous section. We can summarize the main …ndings in the relationship (n; S; ) between the individual pro…ts, the number of …rms n, the market size S and the variable that captures the intensity of price competition. This latter, therefore, can be referred to the degree of substitutability among di¤erentiated products, as we did in Section 3.2, as well as on the mode of competition (price, quantity, collusion). Hence, the individual pro…ts are decreasing in the number of …rms, increasing in market size and decreasing in the intensity of competition.
The maximum number of …rms n in a symmetric free entry equilibrium (SFEE) is then captured by the two conditions:
The former ensures that all the active …rms make non negative net pro…ts, whereas the latter implies that in a market equilibrium with n +1 …rms each one would not cover the sunk entry costs. Given the monotonicity of the individual pro…ts in n we can therefore write 20 n = n(S; F; ); (27) where
Hence, our main predictions state that the number of …rms in a symmetric free entry equilibrium is increasing in market size, decreasing in the sunk entry costs (economies of scale) and decreasing in the intensity of competition. 21 Interestingly, relaxed competition (a lower ), as it may arise if products are weakly substitute, or in case the industry is cartelized, goes along with an increased number of …rms. We can further notice that if marginal costs are constant, market size increases multiplicatively the pro…ts and therefore the number of …rms depends on the ratio F=S that captures the relevance of economies of scale with respect to market size. 2 0 We consider here for convenience n as de…ned on R + ignoring the integer issue. Then, given the monotonicity of pro…ts in n the two conditions for a SFEE boil down to (n ; S; ) = F . 2 1 We express the relationship between n and to encompass both the case when is de…ned over a compact interval (the substitutability parameter in the di¤erentiated products models) and when it is a discrete index measuring the intensity of competition (as when comparing collusive and non-cooperative equilibria).
The SFEE identi…es the maximum number of …rms sustainable given market fundamentals and the prevailing strategic behavior. More speci…cally, in di¤er-entiated products markets we have identi…ed the maximum number of varieties sustainable in a SFEE, assuming that each variety requires to sink a cost F to be produced, whereas the number of …rms may be lower if some of them o¤er a portfolio of di¤erent varieties. 22 
Free entry and social e¢ ciency
Moving from the positive to the normative analysis, we are interested in evaluating whether the entry process leads to an optimal, excessive or insu¢ cient number of …rms. A frequent presumption is that guaranteeing conditions of free entry is desirable from a social point perspective. The analysis we have developed in the previous sections allows to address this issue and to verify whether and under which conditions free entry leads to socially desirable outcomes. Spence (1976) and Dixit and Stiglitz (1977) have explored the issue in a monopolist competition set-up, …nding that the number of varieties in a free entry equilibrium falls short of the social optimum. In a homogeneous product environment, instead, von Weizsäcker (1980) and Perry (1984) established an opposite result, with too many …rms entering with respect to the social optimum.
We discuss the social e¢ ciency of SFEE following Mankiw and Whinston (1986) and Amir et al. (2014) and adopting the same two-stage game of the previous sections. We analyze a second best welfare maximization problem where the social planner is assumed to control the number of …rms but to be unable to a¤ect or determine the behavior of the active …rms once they enter. We start with the case of homogeneous products and quantity competition and then move to a product di¤erentiation and price competition environment.
We can borrow from the analysis of symmetric market equilibria three conditions that we proved to hold under fairly general conditions in the Cournot model: 23 1. In the symmetric equilibrium the individual output is decreasing in n: q(n) > q(n 0 ) for n 0 > n; 2. Total output is increasing in the number of …rms: Q(n) = nq(n) < Q(n 0 ) = n 0 q(n 0 ) for n < n 0 ;
3. The price cost margin is non negative for any number of …rms, and strictly positive for a …nite number of …rms: P (Q(n)) C 0 (q(n)) 0 for all n and P (Q(n)) C 0 (q(n)) > 0 for n …nite.
Given these features, the social planner maximizes total welfare by choosing the number of …rms:
Let us de…ne n W the solution. Then, under 1 3, the SFEE number of …rms is higher than the social optimum, that is n > n W . The result can be easily proved by noting that the …rst order conditions in problem (29) are:
Since in SFEE (n ) = F , @q @n < 0 by condition 1 and P (Q(n )) C 0 (q(n )) > 0 for n …nite given condition 3, it follows that W 0 (n ) < 0 and therefore n > n W . The economic intuition of the excessive entry result is straightforward: when an additional …rm enters, it adds to the social welfare the pro…t (n) F but, at the same time, it steals output, and therefore pro…ts, from the other …rms, the last term in the derivative (30), second line. The business stealing e¤ ect, captured by condition 1 above, creates a wedge between the private incentives of the entrant, and the social e¤ect of entry, explaining why too many …rms enter in a SFEE. 24 The case of di¤erentiated products adds an additional e¤ect of entry on welfare, since more …rms imply a larger set of varieties available to the consumers. Following Spence (1976) we capture this e¤ect assuming that the gross consumers bene…t is
where q is the vector of outputs, f (0) = 0, f 0(:) > 0 and f 00 (:) 0 for all q i 0 implies a preference for variety and G 0 (z) > 0, G 00 (z) < 0 for all z 0 quali…es products as substitutes 25 . The social planner then solves the problem
Contrary to the case of homogeneous products, when products are di¤eren-tiated in general we cannot rank the number of …rms in a SFEE and the socially optimal one. The reason is immediately evident from the …rst order conditions of the problem:
Condition (32) shows that an additional …rm adds to total welfare the pro…ts generated (n) F , and further a¤ects total welfare with two additional terms. The …rst one corresponds to the business stealing e¤ect already identi…ed in the case of homogeneous products, and captures the fact that the new …rm subtracts output and pro…ts to the competitors, with a lower net social gain than the private one and a bias towards excessive entry.
The last term is new and refers to the impact of an additional variety on consumers'surplus. G 0 f is the marginal social e¤ect of the new variety, whereas G 0 f 0 q is the …rm revenue. Since the …rm does not internalize all the social bene…t of the additional variety, the private incentives are lower than the social ones, leading to underprovision of varieties.
In this general setting the two con ‡icting terms do not allow to sign W 0 (n ) and evalutate whether an eccessive, insu¢ cient or optimal number of …rms enter in a SFEE. Under more speci…c assumptions on the utility function, we can generate examples where the ranking can be established. For instance, Dixit and Stiglitz (1977) using a CES utility function obtain that the SFEE number of …rms is short of the social one, reverting the case of excessive entry that characterizes a homogenous product environment.
Free entry equilibria without symmetry
Although a symmetric environment is a natural reference when analyzing long run free entry equilibria we may be interested in the e¤ects of free entry in oligopoly markets when some kind of asymmetry has long lasting e¤ects. This may come from the existence of patents or other frictions in the adoption of process innovations that prevent the equalization of production techniques, from persisting advantages on the demand side coming from quality or brand image, as well as from institutional features that a¤ect the behavior of …rms, as for instance the coexistence of di¤erent ownership structures or the presence of state-owned …rms. Since free entry equilibria suggest the pattern of adjustment when the entry process unfolds, asymmetric oligopolies are an interesting and relevant case to be addressed.
Once …rms intrinsically di¤er, the number of …rms is no more a relevant statistics to describe, in a positive or normative sense, the long run equilibria.
However, many of the oligopoly models we have already considered in a symmetric setting share a particular property, that of being aggregative games, that allows dealing easily with asymmetric environments. 26 The pro…ts of …rm i in an aggregative oligopoly game can be written as a function of a choice variable (action) a i and of the sum of the actions of all that is i (a i ; A) . A very simple illustration is the Cournot model already considered in Section 3.1. Setting q i = a i we can write i (a i ; A) = P (A)a i C i (a i ). We recognize an aggregative structure also in some of the models of product di¤erentiation 27 . In the linear model from Singh and Vives (1984) , indeed, setting p i = a i the pro…ts write as:
Even the logit model shares the feature of an aggregative game, once we de…ne a i = exp( p i ): the pro…ts can be written as
To illustrate the main features of aggregative games, we use here the linear Cournot model i (q i ; Q) = (a bQ c i )q i as an example. The traditional setting describes the pro…t function as depending on the own output and the aggregate of the other …rms'production Q i = P j6 =i q j , that is i (q i ; Q i ) = (a b(q i + Q i ) c i )q i and identi…es the best reply
Alternatively, following the aggregative setting we can identify the inclusive best reply …rst introduced by Selten (1970) , where the optimal individual output is consistent with a given aggregate level of production 28 :
Notice that an equilibrium exists only if
e q i (Q) = Q, that is if the sum of the inclusive best replies has a …xed point. 29 Further we can de…ne …rm i's pro…ts, 2 6 See on free entry equilibria with aggregative oligopoly games Anderson et al (2015) . 2 7 It is immediate to notice that address models with n > 3, as the Salop circular road model described above, are not aggregative games, since the pro…ts of each …rm depends only on a subset of prices. 2 8 It is immediate to notice that both expressions come directly from the …rst order conditions
when it and all …rms choose their inclusive best reply, as a function of total output Q:
that is strictly decreasing in Q. The function (33) plays a fundamental role in the analysis of free entry equilibria when asymmetries are admitted. Indeed, it allows to map the total equilibrium output -in general the aggregate A -into the pro…ts of the individual …rms, where therefore Q replaces the number of …rms as the key driver of equilibrium pro…ts in an asymmetric setting. Continuing with our Cournot example, a Free Entry Equilibrium (FEE) can be de…ned as a set of quantities f(q i ) i2I g and a set of entrants I I m , where I m is the set of all m potential entrants, such that
where Q I = P i2I e q i (Q I ) is the aggregate output of the entrants I. Notice that we are not imposing symmetry in gross pro…ts i nor in the sunk costs F i . As a …nal step, it is often argued that the marginal entrant in a free entry equilibrium gains zero pro…t, a condition that is shared by all …rms in a symmetric equilibrium. Anderson et al (2015) assume that, among the potential entrants, there is a subset e I m of symmetric marginal …rms 30 with identical pro…t function i = e (q i ; Q) and entry cost F i = F e for all i 2 e. Some of these marginal …rms may be active, belonging to the set e a I.
In a Zero Pro…t Free Entry Equilibrium (ZPFEE) a non empty set of marginal …rms e a is active and gains zero pro…t. More formally, a ZPFEE is a FEE with a set I of active …rms such that e a I and i = i (Q I ) = F i for all i 2 e a , where i (:) is given by (33) . The existence of a fringe of symmetric active marginal entrants allows to combine the zero pro…t condition of the marginal …rms with a unique level of aggregate output Q I and with a variety of pro…t levels of the inframarginal (asymmetric) …rms. Indeed, since i (Q) is decreasing in Q, from the zero pro…t condition for the active marginal …rms we obtain Q I , and this latter determines the pro…ts of the other inframarginal …rms i (Q I ). The number of active marginal …rms e a is then adjusted through the entry process to …nd the ZPFEE.
To illustrate these properties it is interesting to analyze how the ZPFEE varies when exogenous changes in the set of inframarginal …rms occur, modifying their pro…t structure and, consequently, the optimal output they deliver to the market. Let us consider an exogenous shock that a¤ects a subset I C of inframarginal …rms (the changed …rms), as for instance a process innovation, or a merger, or a privatization, while leaving the other inframarginal …rms in subset I U (the unchanged …rms) una¤ected. Hence, in the initial state,
Then, after the shock the set of active …rms in a ZPFEE moves from I to I 0 . All the changed and unchanged inframarginal …rms remain active both before and after the shock, i.e. I C = I 0 C and I U = I 0 U . The adjustment to the new ZPFEE works through a variation in the set of active marginal entrant: e a 6 = e 0 a . Since e 0 a 6 = ; in the new equilibrium, i = e (Q I 0 ) = F e must hold for i 2 e 0 a and therefore total output remains the same, that is Q I 0 = Q I . Consequently, the pro…ts of the unchanged inframarginal …rms do not vary. Hence, for instance, a reduction in the marginal cost of the changed inframarginal …rms I C leads them to produce more in the new ZPFEE whereas the unchanged inframarginal …rms I U maintain the same level of production. Since total ouput does not vary, the set of marginal …rms shrinks as it does their overall production, adjusting the larger production of the changed inframarginal …rms and maintaining total output Q I at the initial level.
This property of the ZPFEE encompasses also the case of the "aggressive leaders" in Etro (2006) where one …rm, the leader, is the inframarginal agent and the other symmetric …rms, the followers, belong to the active marginal entrant group e a . A change in the pro…ts of the leader, for instance due to some investment, as Etro (2006) writes, "does not a¤ect the equilibrium strategies of the other …rms, but it reduces their equilibrium number". Interestingly, in this setting with an endogenous number of followers, if the investment increases the marginal pro…t of the leader, this latter has an incentive to overinvest, no matter whether competition is in strategic complements or substitutes. Indeed, if the market equilibrium output does not change with its investment whereas its market share and pro…ts increase, the leader will overinvest. In the limit, if the investment is not costly, the leader has the incentive to produce more than the usual Stackelberg leader's output and to monopolize the market preventing the entry of the followers. This result of generalized over-investment is strikingly di¤erent from what happens when the number of followers (entrants) is given and exogenous. In the taxonomy proposed by Fudenberg and Tirole (1984) , when the investment increases the marginal pro…t, the leader over-invests (top dog) if competition is in strategic substitutes but it under-invests (puppy dog) when it competes in strategic complements.
Aggregative games greatly simplify also the normative analysis of asymmetric environments. Starting with the case of homogeneous products, we observe that consumers'surplus depends on aggregate output only, 31 i.e. CS = CS(Q), with CS(0) = 0, CS 0 (:) > 0 and CS 00 (:) 0 for all Q 0. Then, when a shock a¤ects a subset of inframarginal …rms while leaving unchanged total output Q I , consumers' surplus does not vary as well. The only impact on social welfare comes from the variation in pro…ts of the changed inframarginal …rms I C . Indeed, the pro…ts of the unchanged inframarginal …rms I U do not vary and the change in the number of active marginal …rms from e a to e 0 a does not a¤ect welfare, since they gain zero pro…ts. We conclude that if a shock induces a pro…table adjustment in a subset of …rms and a shift in output composition, total welfare increases of the same amount of the pro…ts of the a¤ected …rms, quite in constrast with the impact in the short run when the number of …rms does not vary.
To appreciate the result, let us consider the welfare impact of a merger between two …rms absent any e¢ ciency gain. The short run e¤ects are well known in the IO literature: the merged entity internalizes the negative externalities and contracts output, the outsiders react by expanding their production. The net e¤ect is a fall in total output, consumers'surplus and total welfare, an increase in outsiders'pro…ts and, in case of constant returns to scale, a fall in insiders' pro…ts. 32 Once we consider entry and ZPFEE, however, the e¤ects change signi…cantly. Since additional active marginal …rms enter in reaction to the short run adjustments, total output, consumers'surplus and outsiders'pro…ts (I U and e a ) do not change. The insiders'(I C ) pro…ts, due to their output contraction, are weakly lower. If, however, the merger allows to realize e¢ ciencies, insiders'pro…ts, as well as their incentive to merge, increase, as it does total welfare. This result brings in a strong policy implication in favor of lifting ex-ante merger control and authorization policies. Indeed, since the long-run private and social e¤ects of a merger coincide, if private …rms have an incentive to merge, then social welfare will raise, whereas socially damaging mergers would never be implemented given the lack of private incentives. 33 In the welfare analysis of homogeneous product markets, we assumed that consumers'surplus depends only on total output but not on its allocation among the active …rms. Moving to a di¤erentiated products environment a similar assumption may be more problematic. Indeed, Anderson et al (2015) show that in aggregative oligopoly games with di¤erentiated products a riallocation of a given aggregate among the di¤erent varieties, although neutral on the ZPFEE conditions, may a¤ect total surplus and welfare. In other words, it may be that consumers'surplus does not depend only on the aggregate, but also on its composition.
They show that the dependence of consumers'surplus on the aggregate only still persists with di¤erentiated products if the demand functions satisfy the Indipendence of Irrelevante Alternatives (IIA) property, that is if the ratio of any two demands depends only on their own prices and not on the prices of other, unconsidered, alternatives. Notably, the logit model, as well as the demand functions derived from the CES utility function, satisfy the IIA and therefore the corresponding oligopoly game not only is aggregative, but allows to express consumers'surplus as a function of the sum of the prices only. 34 
Endogenous sunk costs and persistent concentration
The entry decision in the previous sections involved sinking a …xed set-up cost F that was related to some initial indivisible investment. We have not further speci…ed the nature of these outlays. Assuming that the level of the sunk cost F is an exogenous parameter with respect to the entry and market strategies may be explained referring to technology (e.g. investment in a minimum ef…cient scale plant) or institutions (e.g. the payment of a licence fee needed to operate). The sunk cost may vary, allowing us to estrapolate comparative statics properties, but for reasons orthogonal to the market strategies adopted by the active …rms once entered. In this sense we can label the environments considered so far as characterized by exogenous sunk costs.
In this setting, the amplitude of the sunk costs F compared to the size of the market S was a fundamental driver in determining the maximum number of …rms sustainable in a free entry equilibrium. The limiting case, when F becomes negligible with respect to S, leads to convergence to a competitive equilibrium with an in…nite number of …rms, vanishing externalities and price converging to the marginal cost.
Although this paradigm can apply to several industries, there are many other sectors where a relevant part of the sunk costs arise due to speci…c market strategies of the …rms, that in general we may connect to the e¤ort of reaching a competitive advantage and market leadership. This is the case with investments in advertising, that enhance the perceived quality of the product, or with R&D expenditures aimed at improving the e¢ ciency of the technology or the quality of the products. 35 Similar e¤ects take place in industries, as media and entertainment, where market leadership can be reached by securing speci…c, non reproducible inputs as, for instance, talent and premium contents. 36 In all these examples, a competitive advantage is reached through enhanced efforts and, therefore, higher sunk costs. We label this second class of economic environments as endogenous sunk costs.
When sunk costs react to market incentives, we may expect that the entry process, that is constrained by the need to repay all the sunk outlays, is a¤ected. Indeed, market size, that drives the tendency to fragmentation in an exogenous 3 4 It should be stressed that aggregative product di¤erentiation models not necessarely satisfy the IIA, as it is evident, for instance, considering the linear model drawn from Singh and Vives (1984) . In this case consumers' surplus depends not only on the aggregate price but also on its composition. 3 5 A pathbreaking contribution in the theory and empirical analysis of these industries is due to Sutton (1991) and (1998) books, the former referred to advertising intensive industries and the latter to R&D intensive sectors. See also Sutton (2007) for a comprehensive review. 3 6 See on these examples Motta and Polo (1997) and (2003).
sunk cost industry, has the additional e¤ect of increasing the marginal return to market leadership, pushing up e¤orts for leadership and endogenous sunk costs. A central result of the endogenous sunk cost case claims that, if the incentives to high e¤ort are su¢ ciently high, an increase in market size does not lead to a more and more fragmented market structure. There exists an upper bound to fragmentation such that, even in the limit, large …rms and concentration persist. We illustrate this result through a very simple model due to Schmalensee (1992) 37 that conveys the main ideas and intuition. In this setting we set the price p > c …xed and concentrate on the investment in advertising A i . The demand for product i has a structure similar to the one in discrete choice models:
where S is market size and P i …rm i's market share. Moreover,
where 2 [0; 2] is a parameter that measures the mobility of consumers in reaction to advertising outlays. Notice that
where the last two terms refer to endogenous sunk costs in advertising (A i ) and exogenous sunk entry costs (F ). In this setting there exists a symmetric Nash equilibrium in advertising levels
that is increasing in market size S and in consumers'reactivity to advertising . Plugging into the pro…t function and taking into account that in a symmetric equilibrium P i = 1=n, the zero pro…t condition can be rewritten as:
where n is a solution of the above equation, that is the SFEE number of …rms. The last term is referred to exogenous sunk costs F and vanishes as the size of the market S increases inde…nitely. However, the …rst two terms, that are directly related to the endogenous sunk costs in advertising outlays, present a di¤erent pattern: they do not depend on market size 38 .
When 1, corresponding to consumers poorly reacting to advertising, and therefore a weak competitive pressure for market leadership, the single positive solution n of (38) increases inde…nitely in market size S, reproducing a pattern we already observed in pure exogenous sunk cost models. However, for 2 (1; 2] the incentives to invest in market leadership bite and advertising increases in larger markets, pushing up the endogenous sunk costs. In this latter case
The entry process in this case is predominantly governed by the endogenous sunk costs, an the number of …rms sustainable is bounded above for any market size, implying persistent concentration. 39 Moreover, the endogenous sunk costs tend to raise more quickly when consumers are more responsive to advertising, increasing concentration. Interestingly, in exogenous sunk costs environments more intense competition is associated with a lower n and a more concentrated market, although these features dilute and vanish when the market size increases inde…nitely. This patter of a higher concentration when competition is harsher, instead, persists in endogenous sunk cost industries even with growing market size.
Frictionless entry and contestability
The general result in the endogenous and exogenous sunk costs cases claims that there exists a maximum number of …rms sustainable in a free entry equilibrium, and that it is decreasing in the amplitude of the sunk costs F compared with market size S. A concentrated market, in turn, is associated with non competitive mark-ups and allocative ine¢ ciency. In the limit, when the economies of scale are particularly relevant, then, we might …nd that only one …rm can operate in the market, a case of natural monopoly. The …rm will set the monopoly price p m , being able to cover the high …xed costs with the monopoly margins. A second, symmetric entrant, pushing down with its additional output the market price to p(2) = P (Q(2)), would make losses since by de…nition in a natural monopoly it would be unable to cover the …xed costs. Then, there is a range of …xed costs such that the monopoly price is charged and no entry occurs. Similar adopt. However, a general property of this class of models is that when market size increases inde…nitely, gross pro…ts and investment costs once we reach a certain number of …rms tend to increase at the same rate. In this case, when S increases, boosting the gross pro…ts, the incentives to invest in market leadership increase accordingly and the endogenous sunk costs increases at the same rate, preventing entry of additional …rms.
cases can be generated where a small number of …rms can be sustained in a free entry equilibrium.
The contestable markets approach 40 challenges this view, arguing that when entry is frictionless, structural monopoly or oligopoly environments do not lead to monopoly or oligopoly pricing and the associated allocative distortions. Indeed, potential competition may exert a su¢ cient corrective e¤ect on the incumbent, inducing it to set a (second best) e¢ cient price to prevent temporary (hit and run) entry. Allocative e¢ ciency is therefore ensured by (potential) competition even when economies of scale are so relevant to prevent actual competition.
This striking result re-establishes in a free entry environment a central feature of the Bertrand result, that claims no relationship exists between the number n > 1 of active …rms and the (socially e¢ cient) oligopoly equilibrium. Indeed, as the exogenous sunk cost paradigm extends to the free entry case the Cournotian result, the contestable market approach brings on the stage of the free entry story a Bertrand-type ‡avour.
It is now time to specify more in detail what, in a symmetric setting, we mean by frictionless entry. As a general point, the incumbent …rm and the (potential) entrant are, under any respect, perfectly identical.
Since we are considering a natural monopoly, the …rst issue to address is the nature and amplitude of the …xed costs. Let us consider the following example. On the supply side, suppose that, in order to operate in the industry, it is necessary to bear a total investment F for an indivisible capital good that provides production services over a time horizon T . Let us divide this total time in t periods, whose length we are going to specify below. The incumbent …rm I, then, has to cover a fraction f = F=t of the …xed costs in each of the t periods it is active in the market, and has variable costs C I (q I ). Let us consider the case f 2 ( 2 ; m ], where 2 are the gross pro…ts from duopoly and m the monopoly gross pro…ts. Under this assumption the number of …rms sustainable in the market is n = 1, that is the market is a natural monopoly.
The potential entrant E, if it is willing to enter, has to pay F = t f to purchase the capital good. If, after one period, E decides to exit, the residual value of the capital good is (t 1) f . Let 2 [0; 1] be the fraction of the residual value that can be cashed back by reselling the capital good or by using it in other markets. This parameter measures the sunkness of the initial investment, with = 1 corresponding to the case when the capital good can be e¢ ciently recovered after exit and < 1 to some level of sunkness. If E enters and produces, its costs are C E (q E ). It is evident that, since the incumbent can e¢ ciently use the capital good in the market for the entire length of its economic life, the entrant is in a symmetric position on the supply side only if = 1 and C E (q) = C I (q).
Turning to demand, for a given price p the entrant's demand is D E (p) D I (p) where the equal sign corresponds to a symmetric position towards the customers, that are uncommitted and can switch to the entrant if the price p E is more attractive than the incumbent's one p I .
The timing of the game is as follows: at s = 0 the incumbent sets a price p I that cannot be changed for a period of length T =t; just after p I is set the entrant posts its own price p E ; once the two prices are set, the customers choose which of the two …rms to patronize and are supplied immediately; at s = T =t, before the incumbent changes its price, the entrant exits and resells (or re-uses) the capital good collecting (t 1)f .
Once unbundled the contestable market story, some key ingredients become evident.
1. There is no administrative restriction on entry, as licences or authorizations;
2. Demand and supply quantities adjust instantaneously while price changes take time.
In this environment, the incumbent sets a (limit) price that prevents the temporary entry of the competitor:
If we compare (39) with the second best Ramsey price
we can immediately notice that the limit price set by the incumbent is second best e¢ cient if three further conditions hold:
3. The entrant has access to the same technology as the incumbent, with no restrictions coming from patents or privately owned know how: C E (q) = C I (q); moreover, it can instantaneously change the level of production at the desired level;
4. The customers look at the entrant and the incumbent as o¤ering perfect substitutes and have no restriction or costs in switching from one to the other: D E (p) = D I (p);
5. The …xed indivible investment is not sunk and the entrant recovers entirely the residual value of the capital good: = 1.
Under assumptions 1 5 potential competition is able to discipline the incumbent and induces second best e¢ cient outcomes in markets plagued by substantial economies of scale and concentration. Intuitively, perfect symmetry of the incumbent and the entrant and frictionless entry allows the market to be supplied, indi¤erently, by either of the two …rms. If the incumbent commits to a pro…table price, it is temporarely replaced by the entrant through undercutting. In this case, the identity of the provider changes for a period, although the market remains a monopoly. To avoid undercutting, the incumbent is forced to adopt the e¢ cient limit price equal to the average costs. This remarkable result is derived under a set of speci…c assumptions, and can be evaluated both with respect to its empirical relevance and theoretical robustness. On the theoretical ground, the limit price expression (39) clearly shows that substantial departures from the second best e¢ cient price occur when any of the assumptions is weakened.
Turning to the empirical relevance, the contestable market approach has inspired the liberalization of the airline industry in the US in the late Seventies. 41 In this sector a market corresponds to a route, and therefore the large investments in aircrafts are not speci…c to a market: the aircrafts can be moved to other routes or resold in an e¢ cient market. Alternatively, the carriers can lease the aircrafts The other …xed costs, check-in and handling services, are speci…c to airports, and therefore to the routes served. In the market reform the airports, rather than the carriers, supplied these services, leasing them to the carriers on a variable cost basis. Hence, assumption 5 of no sunkness seems consistent with the empirical data, as well as the access to the same technology (Assumption 3). Price stickiness may derive from contractual constraints on fares posted in advance (Assumption 2), and lifting authorizations was a key measure of the reform (Assumption 1). However, Assumption 4 was the Achilles'heels of the reform, since slots were assigned under grandfather's right, and the peak-hours more pro…table ones remained in the portfolio of the incumbents. Moreover, in the years after the reform the carriers reorganized the routes from a spoke-tospoke to a hub-and-spoke pattern, enhancing their dominant role on large hubs and achieving high load factors. With D E (p) < D I (p), after an initial phase of turbolence, the incumbents were able to pro…tably prevent entries and maintain dominance on their key hubs.
Hence, although intellectually brilliant, the contestable market approach hardly can be considered a general theory of free market equilibria due to its lack of robustness. Although potential competition is an important ingredient in entry games, its impact on the behavior of active …rms has to be carefully evaluated from an empirical point of view.
Conclusions
In this Chapter we have reviewed the di¤erent branches of the IO literature that analyzes free entry equilibria and the endogenous determination of market structure. A recurrent theme refers to the assumption of symmetric …rms, that in a long run perspective can be justi…ed when the friction to access to technology and the features of demand allow all …rms to refer to a common set of best practice techniques and to exploit the possibility of (horizontal) product di¤erentiation. In this perspective, a very rich class of oligopoly models is characterized by signi…cantly similar comparative statics properties of the market prices, quantities and pro…ts when the number of active …rms increases. Two limiting cases emerge, the perfectly competitive and the monopolistic competitive outcomes, when the number of …rms increases inde…nitely. The monotone comparative statics tools allow identifying the general conditions behind these results. Long run market structures under free entry are determined by a small set of elements referred to technology (economies of scale) and preferences (market size), with an additional ingredient related to strategies and the intensity of price competition. Hence, the general result of free entry enquilibria provides a solid theoretical foundation to the traditional approach of Industrial Economics based on the Structure-Conduct-Performance paradigm.
The normative properties of free entry equilibria show that in a homogeneous product setting the business stealing e¤ect is the key element that creates a wedge between the private incentives and the social planner, determining an excessive number of …rms. When product di¤erentiation is introduced, however, an opposite externality leading to underprovision of varieties comes in, since the private incentives to enter do not include the bene…ts of an increased number of substitute products on consumers.
While symmetric market games are a useful reference for the long run evolution of markets, asymmetric settings may be relevant both in the long run, when frictions persist, and as a starting point to study the evolution of market structure under free entry. It is relevant to notice that some form of symmetry is maintained also in this framework, that exploits the aggregative nature of many oligopoly models, by assuming that the (relatively ine¢ cient) marginal entrants are all alike. The zero pro…t condition on the marginal entrants, together with the aggregative nature of the market games, then generates unconventional long run e¤ects when a shock hits the active …rms. Indeed, in the new free entry equilibria the total output remains unchanged, while its composition varies, with the change in output of the …rms a¤ected by the shock absorbed by an opposite variation in the number of marginal entrants. A hands-o¤ policy implication comes together with these results.
Endogenous sunk costs related to market strategies provide a di¤erent pattern of adjustment characterized by persistent concentration even in very large markets, in contrast with the tendency to fragmentation when sunk costs are exogenous. Finally, we review the attempt to establish e¢ cient entry equilibria even in markets characterized by huge economies of scale and structural concentration, including natural monopolies, by assuming frictionless entry and giving a role to potential competition. The contestable markets paradigm refreshes in a free entry set-up the features of Bertrand competition, in contrast with the Cournotian paradigm of the exogenous sunk costs approach. Once again, symmetry plays a role, since the e¤ectiveness of potential competition in disciplining dominant …rms rests on the assumption that the entrants can perfectly replace 32 the incumbent during their temporary raid in the market.
